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Negotiating Brexit: A Clash of Approaches?
By Magdalena Frennhoff Larsén and Sangeeta Khorana
Abstract
On 31 January 2020 the UK left the European Union after 47 years of membership. This 
paper uses the conceptual distinction between integrative and distributive bargaining to 
compare the EU’s and the UK’s approaches in the negotiations that led to the Withdrawal 
Agreement, setting out the term for the UK’s exit, and the Political Declaration on the 
framework for the future EU-UK relationship. While it would be rational to expect both 
parties to adopt integrative approaches given the nature of the issues, the long history of 
cooperation, and the parties’ mutual interest in maintaining a close relationship in the future, 
the comparison demonstrates that it was mainly the EU that leaned towards the integrative 
end of the negotiating spectrum, with extensive internal consultations, a willingness to engage 
in open and interest-based discussions aimed at problem-solving, and high levels of 
transparency, whereas the UK leaned further to the distributive end, reflecting less 
engagement and consultation with domestic constituents, a focus on pre-determined positions 
that need defending, and lower levels of transparency. 
Key words: European Union, Negotiations, Brexit, Integrative, Distributive 
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Introduction
The United Kingdom’s (UK) departure from the European Union (EU), or ‘Brexit’, on 31 
January 2020 was a momentous event. It separated the UK from the EU after 47 years of 
membership, and it was the first time a member state (MS) left the EU. Ever since the UK 
took the decision to leave the EU through a referendum in 2016, Brexit has received extensive 
scholarly attention and engendered a ‘flood of writing’ (Hill, 2019) examining the reasons 
behind the referendum result and the potential impact on the UK and the EU. However, the 
actual negotiations that provided the basis for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU have 
received less scholarly attention. Research highlights the institutional complexity and the 
unprecedented nature of the negotiations (e.g. Durant et al., 2018; Ott and Ghauri, 2019; 
Patel, 2018), but few systematically analyse the negotiating approaches adopted in the 
withdrawal negotiations (exceptions include Martill and Staiger’s [2018] and Eidenmüller’s 
[2017] analyses of the UK’s approach).
This paper uses the conceptual distinction between integrative and distributive bargaining 
(e.g. Fisher and Ury, 1981; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Odell, 2000) and offers a comparative 
assessment of the EU’s and the UK’s approaches in the negotiations that led to the 
Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and the Political Declaration setting out the framework for the 
future relationship between the two parties.  While it would be logical to expect both parties 
to adopt integrative approaches, given the nature of the issues, the long history of cooperation, 
and both parties’ interest in maintaining a close relationship in the future, the paper argues 
that it was mainly the EU that adopted such an approach, whereas the UK followed a more 
distributional approach.
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The comparison demonstrates how the EU’s approach reflected close inter-institutional 
engagement with domestic constituents, unprecedented unity, a willingness to engage in open 
and interest-based discussions aimed at problem-solving, and high levels of transparency. In 
contrast, the UK’s approach reflected a lack of consultation with domestic constituents, a 
political system engulfed by internal splits and resignations, an insistence on sticking to pre-
determined positions, and lower levels of transparency. This clash of approaches has led to 
relational tensions and decreasing levels of trust, which, in turn, is likely to affect the 
negotiations about the future EU-UK relationship.
Theoretical Framework: Integrative versus Distributive Negotiating Approaches
When analysing negotiation processes, authors differentiate between ‘integrative’ and 
‘distributive’ behaviour (Walton and McKersie, 1965). Integrative negotiating behaviour, also 
referred to as ‘problem-solving’, ‘collaborative’, ‘win-win’ or ‘principled negotiation’ 
strategies (e.g. Elgström and Jönsson, 2000; Fisher and Ury, 1981; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; 
Odell 2000) aims to increase the joint gains for all negotiating parties. Distributive 
negotiating behaviour, referred to as ‘conflictual’, ‘competitive’, ‘win-lose’, and ‘positional 
bargaining’ strategies (ibid.) aims to increase a party’s own gains in situations of limited 
resources. These approaches represent two polar ends of the negotiating spectrum, with the 
integrative end reflecting strategies that aim to make all parties better off and focus on goals 
that are not in conflict, and the distributive end reflecting strategies that focus on maximising 
goal attainment for one party when goals are in conflict and there are strong distributional 
consequences between the parties. While approaches adopted in real negotiations rarely 
correspond fully to one or the other of these polar ends, most of them can be placed along this 
4
spectrum, leaning either toward the integrative or the distributive end (Odell, 2000, pp. 31-
33).
Negotiators who adopt integrative behaviour are open and transparent with each other and 
aim to find solutions that will reconcile their respective interests. For them, the maintenance 
of a trusting and long-term relationship has high priority, leading both parties to be 
cooperative and willing to share information about their true interests with each other, thus 
increasing the chances of identifying agreements that benefit both parties (Lax and Sebenius, 
1986; Walton and McKersie, 1966). They also feel more accountable to their stakeholders, or 
domestic constituents, and as a result, they engage in extensive internal consultations (Simões 
2011). 
In contrast, if negotiators adopt a distributive approach, based on positions (rather than 
interests), secrecy, and attempts at gaining advantages at the other party’s expense, there is a 
greater chance of relational tensions. Even if recognising that full information sharing 
increase the chances of identifying an agreement, there are worries that the information might 
be exploited by the other party to gain distributional advantages. These negotiators feel less 
accountable, and therefore consult less with their domestic constituents (Simões, 2011). 
When exploring the negotiating approaches of the EU and the UK during the withdrawal 
negotiations, one would expect an integrative dynamic to have emerged given the nature of 
the issues at stake, the long history of cooperation, and both parties’ interest in maintaining a 
close relationship in the future. In terms of the nature of the issues, many would argue that 
Brexit was unlikely to lead to a win-win situation, and that a lose-lose dynamic better 
captured the situation facing the negotiators. However, most of the issues under negotiation 
did not expose win-lose scenarios as per the distributive logic, but rather united both parties in 
wanting to find solutions that minimise the negative effects that are a natural consequence of 
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the UK leaving the EU after 47 years of membership. For example, both parties had a shared 
goal in ensuring that the rights of non-UK EU citizens living in the UK, and UK citizens 
living in other EU countries, remained as close as possible to the status quo. They also shared 
a commitment to avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland, and solutions to how this 
could be achieved had to be found. Regarding the financial obligations of the UK, there was a 
slightly different dynamic in that the EU wanted to maximise UK contributions, while the UK 
wanted to minimise them. Yet, it was predominantly a technical question about how to 
calculate financial obligations, and a discussion about objective criteria and legal 
commitments, rather than a positional bargaining approach about the exact amount, would be 
reasonable to expect. 
As for the long history of cooperation, the UK had been a member of the EU since 1973, and 
in many areas, including trade, development, the single market, environment and climate 
change, it was seen as a constructive and cooperative member, with interests and preferences 
close to those of the European Commission and other like-minded countries. Through this 
engagement, and with both parties interested in a close relationship in future, there should be 
an incentive to build trust and engage in integrative behaviour. As often highlighted (e.g. 
Odell 2000), in situations where there is a relational objective in maintaining influence with 
the other party and where the relationship is on-going, an integrative approach would be 
rational. 
However, despite rational reasons to expect an integrative negotiating dynamic emerging, this 
did not fully materialise. Even in a negotiating environment conducive to integrative 
bargaining, such a dynamic will only emerge if both parties perceive and approach the 
negotiations in the same way (Van der Schalk et al., 2010), and as argued in the paper, it was 
mainly the EU that leaned towards the integrative end of the negotiating spectrum, whereas 
the UK  leaned more towards the distributive end. To make the argument, the paper compares 
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their respective approaches in the withdrawal negotiations along three inter-related 
characteristics of integrative versus distributive bargaining: stakeholder engagement; interests 
versus positions; and levels of transparency (e.g. Fischer and Ury, 1981; Odell, 2000; Simões, 
2011; Walton and McKersie, 1965).
Comparison between Negotiating Approaches
Stakeholder Engagement: Inter-Institutional Consultations
International agreements require domestic ratification, which makes it important for 
negotiators to know the interests and concerns of their domestic stakeholders or constituents. 
The greater the level of engagement between negotiators and domestic constituents, the 
greater the understanding between them (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Walton and McKersie, 
1966). Negotiators engaging in integrative behaviour, based on openness and information 
sharing vis-à-vis their negotiating partner, tend to adopt a similar behaviour with their own 
constituents (Campbell and Mark, 2006) to which they feel accountable (Simões, 2011). This 
process of liaising with domestic constituents makes negotiators engage in a process of 
learning and systematic information processing, which serves to identify and understand true 
interests, and avoid ‘fixed-pie perceptions’. While domestic stakeholder engagement does not 
always lead to integrative behaviour towards the negotiating partner, it is a precondition for it 
to occur. Negotiators who adopt a distributional approach tend to engage less with 
stakeholders, feel less accountable, and are likely to attach more importance to ‘self-
justification’ (ibid., p. 355). 
This paper limits the comparison of stakeholder engagement to the representative political 
institutions, i.e. the Council of the EU (from hereon ‘the Council’) and the European 
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Parliament (EP) on the EU side, and the UK Parliament and devolved administrations on the 
British side.
The EU’s Approach
Immediately after the official announcement of the UK referendum result, on 25 June 2016, 
the Council appointed Didier Seeuws, former Chef de Cabinet to European Council President 
Herman Van Rompuy, as Head of the Special Task Force on the UK within the General 
Secretariat of the Council. On 27 July 2016, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European 
Commission, appointed Michel Barnier, former European Commissioner and French Foreign 
Minister, as the EU Chief Negotiator for Brexit negotiations. And on 8 September 2016, the 
EP’s Conference of Presidents of Political Groups appointed Guy Verhofstadt MEP, Chair of 
the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Group, and former Prime Minister (PM) of 
Belgium, as the EP’s Brexit Coordinator. 
Under the EU Chief Negotiator, Barnier, a special unit of around 50 people was set up within 
the Commission, the Article 50 Task Force, to lead negotiations with the UK (Maurice, 
2018). Although the Commission had not previously negotiated any withdrawal agreements, 
it drew upon its extensive expertise and experience of negotiating trade agreements with 
countries across the world, and accession agreements through its enlargement process. This 
was clearly seen in the appointment of Sabine Weyand as the Deputy Chief Negotiator. 
Weyand came from DG Trade and had extensive experience of international negotiations. 
Since the start of the withdrawal negotiations the EU negotiators, i.e. Barnier, Weyand and 
the Article 50 Task Force, engaged in close inter-institutional consultations with the Council 
and the EP, both of which had to ratify the final WA. 
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Despite having no existing configurations to deal with Brexit, the Council quickly established 
the Ad hoc Working Party (WP) on Article 50 to support the Permanent Representatives 
Committee (COREPER) (Art. 50) and the General Affairs Council (Art. 50) on the 
withdrawal negotiations. As per Article 50, these bodies were limited to the 27 remaining 
MSs. 
Following the start of the withdrawal negotiations on 19 June 2017, the EU negotiators 
engaged weekly with the WP on Article 50 and COREPER (Art.50), and on a monthly basis 
with the General Affairs Council (Art. 50) (Interview, WP on Article 50 Official, 10/1/2018). 
In addition, they kept the Council informed before, during and after each negotiating round 
with the UK (Maurice 2018). MSs expressed strong support for the approach adopted by the 
EU negotiators. One official of the WP on Article 50 stressed how ‘the people in the task 
force are very politically savvy as well as being hard working and very good at what they do. 
It’s very well managed. And I don’t think you’d get too many MSs who complain about their 
approach, if any’ (Interview, 10/1/2018). In terms of the inter-institutional consultations, it 
was highlighted that ‘information flows are excellent… people are broadly very happy with 
the approach they [Article 50 Task Force] are taking. We set the direction of travel and they 
check in regularly. There is no sense that the Commission will run off and make an offer to 
the UK that MSs states aren’t happy with... they are very consultative’ (ibid.). 
The negotiators aimed to understand and protect the interests of all MSs, something apparent 
in their strong support for Irish concerns about avoiding a hard border between the Republic 
and Northern Ireland (Usherwood 2019). Barnier visited the MSs regularly to meet with 
national political, economic and social representatives (Maurice 2018). At the highest 
political level of MS consultation, the 27 Heads of States or Government met in the European 
Council (Art. 50) format in the presence of Barnier. The European Council (Art. 50) met as 
part of most of the regular European Council meetings held following the referendum. In 
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addition, there were several special European Council (Art. 50) meetings to ensure there were 
no unnecessary delays on the EU side. MSs consequently dedicated a huge amount of time 
and resources to Brexit, and they had to significantly increase their administrative capacity 
both in their Representations in Brussels and the affected national ministries back home 
(Interview, MS Representation Official, 4/3/2019). 
In the EP, a Brexit Steering Group, chaired by Verhofstadt, was set up to prepare and 
coordinate the parliamentary position on Brexit. The Steering Group worked closely with the 
Conference of Presidents as well as the affected Committees. The fact that the EP had its own 
coordinator – something it has not had in any of the EU’s previous international negotiations 
– reflects the importance attached to these negotiations by the EP, and it expressed early on 
that it expected to be properly involved in the negotiations. Indeed, in its first resolution it 
made its full involvement a precondition for its consent to the WA (European Parliament, 
2017).
The EU negotiators engaged regularly with the EP through the Brexit Steering Group, both to 
keep MEPs up-to-date on the negotiations with the UK and to listen to their concerns. The 
close involvement of the EP was seen as crucial to ensure parliamentary ratification, and the 
general view within the EP was indeed that it had been fully consulted, and that it played an 
influential role, particularly in the area of citizens’ rights (Interview, EP official, 20/11/2018). 
This demonstrates how the EU moved swiftly to set up the institutional structures necessary 
to deal with Brexit, reflecting high levels of expertise and an effective system for inter-
institutional consultations. Even if these institutional structures to a great extent mirrored the 
EU’s general processes for conducting international negotiations (Patel 2018), they were 
distinct structures, not to let Brexit ‘interfere with’ on-going Union business (European 
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Council, 2017a). The EU negotiators’ engagement with the Council and the EP also went 
beyond that of any previous negotiation.
This extensive consultation process contributed to unprecedented levels of unity within the 
EU (Interview, WP on Article 50 Official, 10/1/2018). The negotiators were fully aware of 
the concerns and interests of the domestic constituents, and ensured these were respected and 
shared during the negotiations with the UK. As a result, there were never any reasons to 
expect ratification failures of the WA on the EU-side. Indeed, when the two parties eventually 
reached agreement on the final WA on 17 October 2019, it was endorsed by the European 
Council on the same date, and approved by the EP on 29 January 2020 by 621 votes in 
favour, 49 against and 13 abstentions. This reflects an unusually strong parliamentary 
majority, going far beyond the simple majority needed for EP consent, and confirms the 
remarkable unity between the political groups throughout the withdrawal negotiations (Closa, 
2019, p. 10). While only a strong qualified majority of the 27 MSs was required, the Council 
unanimously adopted the decision to conclude the WA on 30 January 2020. 
Throughout the negotiations there was also strong discipline in terms of lines of 
communication. MSs and MEPs were in full agreement that it was Barnier and his team that 
negotiated on behalf of the EU, and that any attempt by the UK to ‘divide-and-rule’ should be 
pre-empted (Nicolaïdis, 2017).  At times, individual MSs and the EP engaged directly with 
the media and the UK, but they never deviated from the EU’s united approach. Their 
interventions followed a supportive rather than competitive logic, and the UK’s attempts to 
bypass the Task Force, and negotiate directly with individual MSs, failed. 
The UK’s Approach
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The UK had no existing institutional set-up on which to base the Brexit process (Rutter and 
McCrae, 2016), and it had to constitute and staff two completely new departments - the 
Department for Exiting the EU (DexEU) (around 600 full-time employees), which was set up 
to handle the withdrawal negotiations specifically – and was consequently wound down after 
31 January 2020 – and the Department for International Trade (DIT) (around 1600 full-time 
employees). Staff numbers in existing departments were also significantly increased as Brexit 
put huge pressure on all of Whitehall, with departments being overstretched and having 
difficulties separating Brexit from on-going business (Owen et al., 2018).  This rapid increase 
of new employees, combined with a high staff turnover, led to a lack of policy experience, 
expertise and institutional memory on the British side (Martill and Staiger, 2018). Sir Ivan 
Rogers’s resignation as UK Ambassador to the EU in early 2017 was a response to the 
government’s reluctance to engage effectively with the UK Representation and its extensive 
expertise. His resignation e-mail stressed the difference in negotiating experience between the 
EU and the UK and the challenge this would pose for the UK (The Guardian, 2017). This 
concern was echoed by an MP reflecting on the Brexit process: ‘Hardly a day goes by when 
the lack of knowledge within Westminster and within the civil service is not being revealed… 
Brexit is shining a spotlight on a collective lack of basic knowledge about the nature of our 
membership of the EU’ (Interview, 16/5/2019).
An additional difficulty faced by the civil service in delivering a coherent negotiating 
approach was the lack of unified political steer. Ever since the negotiations started there were 
tensions between the PM’s office and DexEU, and while formally the Secretary of State for 
DexEU was the chief negotiator, the actual lead was transferred to the Cabinet Office and PM 
Theresa May. A clear sign of this was the move of the lead civil servant on Brexit, Olly 
Robbins, from DexEU to the Cabinet Office in September 2017. The sidelining of DexEU 
and political differences with  the PM led two Secretaries of State for DexEU, David Davies 
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and Dominic Raab, to resign, making Secretary of State Stephen Barclay the third UK 
counterpart of Barnier during the withdrawal negotiations (Durrant et al., 2019). 
The lack of unity within the executive was also seen among the UK domestic constituents, not 
least in Parliament, where the divisions between and within parties were striking (Bulmer and 
Quaglia, 2018, p. 1090). The main division was between those who had supported Leave and 
those who voted Remain in the referendum. Even in some parliamentary Select Committees, 
which are normally seen as a consensual part of Parliament, there were significant divisions. 
This was particularly the case in the Select Committee for Exiting the EU, set up in July 2016, 
with 21 cross party MPs, under the chairmanship of Labour MP Hilary Benn, where the 
division between Leavers and Remainers evolved into a sharp divide between those favouring 
a harder Brexit and those supporting a softer Brexit or Remain (Lynch and Whitaker, 2019). 
These divisions complicated the Committee’s scrutiny work, making it difficult to reach 
consensus among its members. This in turn, made it easier for the government to dismiss the 
Committee’s reports. Benn, and several other Select Committee Chairs, did indeed criticise 
the government for failing to engage with their reports (Lynch and Whitaker, 2019). 
The government’s reluctance to consult with Parliament became evident when the 
government planned to trigger Article 50 autonomously. However, objections were raised, 
and in January 2017 the Supreme Court ruled that the Article could not be triggered without 
parliamentary legislation. As a result, the government introduced a Notification of 
Withdrawal Bill, which was approved by Parliament. However, the two amendments 
proposed by the House of Lords about protection for EU citizens in the UK, and Parliament 
having the final say over any withdrawal agreement, were rejected by the government on the 
grounds that this would constrain its negotiating position (Fabbrini, 2017). 
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After Article 50 was triggered in March 2017, May, who hoped to strengthen her hand in the 
withdrawal negotiations by increasing her parliamentary majority, called a snap election. 
However, the strategy backfired, and in the general election of June 2017 the Conservative 
Party lost its small overall majority, forcing the government into a confidence-and-supply 
arrangement with the Democratic Unionist Party (ibid.). The government thus entered into the 
withdrawal negotiations with a largely divided Parliament. Yet, instead of consulting with the 
different parliamentary sections, the government carried out the negotiations without 
significant parliamentary engagement. This lack of consultation contributed to Parliament’s 
failures to ratify the WA on three occasions (Ruparel, 2019: 6). Even if May insisted she had 
negotiated the best deal possible with the EU, it was difficult for many MPs to accept this 
argument as they felt distanced from the negotiations. 
With the parliamentary deadlock, May had to ask for two extensions to the two-year time 
limit set out by Article 50. The first request extended the initial deadline from 29 March to 12 
April 2019, and the second one until 31 October 2019.  During the second extension, attempts 
were made to find compromises through cross-party talks with the Labour Party. However, 
they collapsed as they were seen to happen too late, i.e. after the WA had already been 
concluded. Given Labour’s preference for remaining in a Customs Union with the EU, 
Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn met with Barnier numerous times to explore this idea, thus 
clearly deviating from the official UK position, and sending competing messages to Brussels.  
In the end, May’s position became unsustainable, and she had to resign. Following a lengthy 
election process in the Conservative Party, Boris Johnson replaced her as PM in July 2019.  
However, the change in leadership did not result in further consultations with Parliament. On 
the contrary, Johnson started his term by advising the Queen to suspend Parliament for over a 
month. Although the Supreme Court later ruled that this advice was unlawful (Marshall 
2019), it was clear that he felt little accountability towards Parliament. This was also 
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exemplified by his expulsion of 21 Conservative MPs who voted against the government, and 
in favour of legislation to block a no-deal scenario at the end of the second extension, which 
led to a number of ministerial resignations, and the Conservative Party’s share of MPs 
decreasing even further.
Johnson embarked on intensive negotiations with the EU to reach agreement on a slightly 
altered WA and Political Declaration just before the second extension expired. Yet, to allow 
for proper scrutiny, Parliament, which had not been consulted during the course of these 
negotiations, voted for an amendment requiring the PM to ask for a third extension. The EU 
granted the extension until 31 January 2020. Recognising that the WA was unlikely to obtain 
parliamentary approval with the existing parliamentary arithmetic, the PM called a general 
election on 12 December 2019, which lead to a significant Conservative majority. Rather than 
engaging with MPs, the PM thus opted for replacing them, and in this way paved the way for 
the WA Bill to be passed by Parliament, which voted 330 to 231 in support. 
In terms of the devolved administrations, there was a lack of genuine engagement throughout 
the withdrawal negotiations. There was an attempt at repurposing the Joint Ministerial 
Committee (JCM) structures, which were initially set up in 1999 to facilitate coordination 
between the UK and the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
by constituting the JMC Sub-committee on EU Negotiations (EN). However, its irregular 
meetings and the fact that the Committee lacked formal decision-making powers frustrated 
efforts of the devolved administrations to input into the negotiations, and there was a strong 
feeling that the views of Scotland and Wales were not taken into account (Institute for 
Government, 2019). The government was criticised for using the Committee to suppress 
disagreements, rather than engaging with it and trying to find solutions (Parliament 2017). 
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In Scotland, which voted Remain by 62% to 38% in the referendum, the government argued 
particularly strongly that Scotland should not be taken out of the EU against its will, and that 
a lack of consultation with Scotland on Brexit would lead to a second Scottish independence 
referendum (Gamble, 2018). Consequently, when May ruled out single market membership – 
a compromise favoured by the Scottish Government, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon and 
Scottish Parliamentary Representatives started engaging directly with Barnier, exploring 
possibilities of a closer EU-Scottish relationship (Scottish Parliament, 2017). This 
engagement, which again illustrates the lack of unity on the UK side and how domestic 
constituents engaged with the EU according to a competitive logic, increased throughout the 
withdrawal negotiations. While the government significantly strengthened its majority in the 
2019 election, so did the Scottish National Party, which increased its number of MPs from 35 
to 48. None of these MPs voted in favour of the WA, and there are now increasing demands 
for a referendum on Scottish independence from the UK. 
Interests versus Positions
Parties adopting integrative approaches signal their willingness to engage in negotiations and 
understand each other’s motivations and priorities (Odell, 2000). The focus is on identifying 
interests, rather than positions, with interests being defined as underlying desires and 
concerns that motivate people to come up with creative ideas and alternatives (Fischer and 
Ury, 1981). While positions, i.e. choices that have been previously decided upon, are likely to 
highlight differences between the parties, interests are often more compatible, allowing 
negotiators to find mutually acceptable solutions. When identifying interests, parties engage 
in an explorative process, before finding solutions that satisfy these interests. Rather than 
arriving with a fixed brief, the parties approach the negotiations with openness and a joint 
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problem-solving attitude (Odell, 2000: 34). Integrative strategies include the proposition of 
agenda items that are seen to benefit both parties (Odell, 2010: 621). In contrast, negotiators 
following a distributional logic enter negotiations presenting pre-determined positions that are 
often developed without considerations for what might be possible for the other side. Once 
these positions have been presented, negotiators become increasingly attached to them, 
making it difficult to deviate from them (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). 
The EU’s Approach
While the EU regretted the result of the referendum in the UK, it respected the result, and 
signalled its readiness to engage in negotiations as soon as the UK would trigger Article 50. 
There was an awareness that time was tight due to the two-year limit set out by Article 50 
(Closa, 2019). The EU negotiators, in consultation with MSs and the EP, started to identify 
the main interests and problems to be addressed during the withdrawal negotiations to ensure 
that the European Council (Art. 50) had the necessary basis to formally adopt the negotiating 
guidelines on 29 April 2017, only a month after the UK triggered Article 50. These guidelines 
stressed that the aim of the withdrawal agreement was about damage control and mitigating 
the losses of the UK leaving the EU. The guidelines, which were translated into negotiating 
directives adopted by the General Affairs Council (Art. 50) on 22 May 2017, instructed the 
EU negotiators to reach an agreement aiming ‘to minimise the uncertainty and disruption 
caused by Brexit for our citizens, business and MSs’ by solving the issues around citizens’ 
rights, the Irish border, and financial commitments (European Council, 2017a). Since the UK 
had not published any negotiating details, the EU guidelines came to form the basis for the 
Terms of Reference for the negotiations, agreed by the EU and the UK during the opening of 
the negotiations on 19 June 2017. If the EU negotiators then were seen to dominate the 
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negotiations, it was mainly because the discussions were based around their guidelines and 
proposals, given the lack of UK proposals (Grant, 2019).
The EU thus set the agenda for the negotiations. However, this agenda did not reflect pre-
determined positions, as per a distributional approach, but rather identified the main problems 
to be solved. The solutions then had to be found during the negotiations between the two 
parties. To the EU itself, it was clear that these negotiations, which posed the unprecedented 
challenge of disentangling a MS, and which were not reflective of traditional ‘give and take’ 
negotiations, had to be approached with a problem-solving attitude (de Rynck, 2019) with 
‘no-one want[ing] to defeat anyone’ (European Council, 2018). At the Special European 
Council (Art.50) meeting of 25 November 2018, Barnier explained how his team ‘negotiated 
with the UK, never against the UK’ and that the deal was ‘necessary to build trust between 
the UK and the EU’ (Reuters, 2018). 
The issues of citizens’ rights and financial commitments were solved relatively quickly, as the 
EU guidelines focused on legality and methodology. Despite some positioning by the UK at 
political level, such as stressing the uncertain status of EU nationals as one of the ‘main cards’ 
of the UK in the negotiations (Elgot 2016), the dynamic emerging at the negotiating table was 
mainly integrative. 
However, in finding the solution to one of the most difficult issues of the negotiations, i.e. 
avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland, the two parties had to work harder to reach 
agreement. The final solution can can be seen as the result of an interest-based approach by 
the EU negotiators, in close cooperation with their UK counterparts, within the tight confines 
created by the UK’s red lines on exiting the single market and the customs union, by the EU’s 
own legal obligations and its compliance with international trade rules, and by both parties’ 
commitment to the Good Friday Agreement (Usherwood, 2019). The first proposed solution 
18
came in the form of a backstop that saw Northern Ireland remaining in a single customs 
territory with the EU to avoid border checks on the island of Ireland after the UK’s exit. The 
backstop would only come into effect unless and until it was superseded by a subsequent 
agreement. Yet, when it became clear that this proposal, agreed by the EU and the UK 
negotiators, had little domestic support within the UK - particularly due to the Democratic 
Unionist Party’s refusal to accept any customs border in the Irish Sea, or any constitutional, 
political or economic differentiation between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK (Menon 
and Bevington, 2019) – the negotiators re-engaged in discussions and came up with a new 
backstop solution that would keep all of the UK within the single customs territory, believing 
such a solution would facilitate ratification in the UK. This solution was included in the 
Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland of the WA, which was concluded by the EU and the UK 
in November 2018. During the subsequent ratification failures in the UK, the backstop 
became the main focus of criticism. The EU first expressed an unwillingness to re-negotiate 
the WA after having spent one and a half years negotiating it, and as it was unclear how any 
changes would satisfy those domestic groups within the UK rejecting the backstop. However, 
with a new leadership in the UK, following the 2019 election, the EU was ready to re-engage 
in negotiations and listen to new proposals from the UK. Through intense negotiations in 
September and October 2019 the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland was thus revised, and 
the backstop was replaced by an arrangement by which all of the UK leaves the EU customs 
union. However, to avoid a hard border on the Island of Ireland, Northern Ireland will apply 
EU customs rules and maintain regulatory alignment with the EU, effectively establishing a 
customs and regulatory border in the Irish Sea (Parliament, 2019). This demonstrates how the 
EU adopted an open approach and engaged in creative thinking to find a solution that would 
avoid a hard border on Ireland, while also recognising the domestic sensitivities in the UK 
and accommodating Johnson’s commitment to re-negotiate the WA before the second 
extension expired on 31 October 2019. Although Johnson was forced to ask for another 
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extension until 31 January 2020 for ratification purposes, the alterations to the WA allowed 
him to claim a negotiation victory. His subsequent success in the December general election 
enabled him to push through the WA without the support of the DUP, which maintained 
concerns about a border down the Irish Sea (McKay, 2020). 
An area where the EU was criticised for adopting a less flexible approach, was the sequencing 
of the negotiations. Although Article 50 does not prescribe a precise structure for the 
negotiations, apart from specifying that the EU needs to be ‘taking account of the framework 
for its [in this case the UK’s] future relationship with the Union’ when negotiating and 
concluding the withdrawal agreement, the EU insisted on agreeing the withdrawal before 
discussing the future relationship (Ruparel 2019). This was a strongly expressed position by 
the European Council, the MSs and the EP, making the EU negotiators unable to 
accommodate the UK’s request of having the two sets of negotiations conducted in parallel, 
which would allow for trade-offs between the terms of the withdrawal and those of the future 
relationship (Craig 2017). The EU recognised the integrative nature of the withdrawal issues, 
and there were worries that if the two negotiations were conducted in parallel, the EU might 
be led into traditional distributional bargaining over issues of a different nature (Maurice, 
2018). In this case the EU can consequently be seen to adopt a less integrative approach. 
However, this approach had a strong legal and practical rationale. It was clear that detailed 
discussions on the future relationship would complicate and delay agreement around the more 
legal, technical and integrative withdrawal issues, which had to be concluded within the two-
year time limit set out by Article 50. It was, after all, in both parties’ interest to agree a 
withdrawal agreement within this time limit, and the EU was certain that negotiations of the 
agreement on the future relationship would take longer. Consequently, even if the two 
negotiations had been conducted in parallel, the UK would still not know whether the future 
relationship deal would be worth taking, before having to agree to the withdrawal agreement 
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(Craig 2017). The fact that the EU convinced the UK to accept the sequencing of the 
negotiations already at the first negotiating round (Green, 2017), hints at the generally 
accepted logic and pragmatism of this approach by both parties. 
Yet, while formal negotiations about the future relationship could not start until after the 
UK’s exit, EU responded to the UK’s position on sequencing and expressed its willingness to 
initiate discussions on the framework for the future relationship, as soon as ‘sufficient 
progress’ had been made on the withdrawal issues (Council of the EU, 2017). Once the 
European Council agreed that sufficient progress had been reached, the EU negotiators 
immediately outlined different options for this relationship, ranging from free trade area 
(FTA) to single market membership (European Commission 2017a), and showed a readiness 
to discuss their respective merits. However, the options were immediately narrowed down by 
the UK’s red lines. The fact that it then took the parties almost two years to agree on just the 
final framework of the future relationship also reflects the unlikeliness of completing both sets 
of negotiations within Article 50’s time limit.  
The UK’s Approach
Rather than engaging in a problem-solving process, the UK negotiators mainly perceived the 
negotiations in win-lose, or ‘zero-sum terms’ (Martill and Staiger, 2018, p. 3), where parties 
had to defend their positions and push the negotiating partner to make concessions. Once they 
adopted a position – often without significant justification or consideration for what was 
actually possible, the negotiators become attached to it, and any deviation was seen as a sign 
of weakness (ibid.). References to the readiness to ‘walk away’ from the negotiations, 
preparations for a ‘no-deal scenario’,  ‘they need us more than we need them’, and ‘we can 
win’ – all characteristic of a distributive approach, were in abundance.
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Already before the withdrawal negotiations began, the UK took a positional stance by 
drawing red lines around free movement of people, independent trade deals, and oversight by 
the Court of Justice of the EU in the PM’s Lancaster House speech (May, 2017). This 
position was adopted without considering the trade-offs in terms of the future EU-UK 
relationship. Once the negotiations moved onto the framework of the future relationship, and 
the EU presented the different options available, the UK was already locked into the FTA 
option, due to these red lines. Rather than engaging in an explorative and open process of how 
to remain as close as possible and minimise the adverse economic impact of Brexit, the UK 
negotiators continuously defended those lines, and there was little room for flexibility (Martill 
and Staiger, 2018). 
Similarly, even though the EU had made the legal and practical reasons for sequencing of the 
negotiations clear, May’s letter triggering Article 50 in March 2017 stressed repeatedly that 
the two should take place in parallel (PM’s Office, 2017), to allow the UK to use its strength 
in some areas, like security, to obtain concessions in others. While it quickly became clear to 
the officials around the negotiating table that this was not possible, the British political 
narrative continued to focus on the need for parallelism long after the start of the negotiations. 
A future trade deal between the two parties was seen to be negotiable within the two-year 
time limit. Yet, this position about parallelism was not anchored in actual preparations of a 
UK trade policy or considerations about the future relationship with the EU (Green, 2017). 
Once the European Council agreed that sufficient progress had been reached on the 
withdrawal issues to start discussing the future in December 2017 (European Council, 2017b), 
the UK took more than six months to develop its future relationship proposal. This was 
somewhat puzzling for the EU, given the UK’s insistence on parallelism and the feasibility of 
reaching a trade deal in principle with the EU before March 2019 (Interview, MS 
Representation Official, 4/3/2019). The proposal that was eventually presented in July 2018, 
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through the Chequers white paper on the future relationship between the UK and the EU, 
outlined the creation of a ‘free trade area for goods’, supported by a ‘common rulebook for 
goods’ on ‘rules necessary to provide frictionless trade at the border’, and the introduction of 
a ‘facilitated customs arrangement’ (HM Government 2018).  Again, the UK’s position did 
not consider what would be acceptable to the EU, particularly in terms of the EU’s 
commitment to safeguarding the integrity of the EU single market, and respecting the 
indivisibility of the four freedoms of movement of goods, services, capital and people. The 
white paper reflected the UK’s wish to agree a ‘deep and special partnership’ with the EU by 
taking some elements of the customs union and single market, but not others. Nevertheless, 
the EU ‘recognised that there were positive elements in the Chequers proposal’ (Parker et al., 
2018), and saw it as a basis for discussion. However, the UK presented the paper as a non-
negotiable end-point instead of a starting-point for negotiations (Durrant et al., 2019). 
The positional approach continued during Johnson’s leadership, although it focused more on 
timing, than content. He insisted on not asking for a third extension to Article 50 in order to 
‘get Brexit done’, thereby prioritising the date, rather than the terms, of the UK’s exit. To 
placate concerns about the impact on trade in the case of a no deal scenario, he argued that an 
FTA could be negotiated during the transition period (Gardner 2020, p.66). Given that there 
would be no transition period without the WA, this illustrates the tendency in the UK not to 
focus on the WA and the agreement on the future relationship as two separate deals, but to 
merge them in the overall Brexit narrative. 
 In addition, Johnson stuck to the position of maintaining the December 31 2020 deadline of 
the transition period, as per the WA negotiated by his predecessor. During the transition, 
which is regulating the EU-UK relationship at the time of writing, the UK is no longer part of 
the EU institutions, but is subject to EU rules and remains a member of the single market and 
the customs union. The purpose of the transition is to allow time to implement the WA, as 
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well as negotiating the future EU-UK relationship. Although the final WA entered into force 
almost a year after the initially envisaged Brexit date of 29 March 2019, and thereby 
significantly reduced the time available to negotiate the future relationship, Johnson’s 
government was committed to the position of ‘getting Brexit done’ and not extend the 
transition deadline (Mason, 2019). This commitment was further strengthened by the 
legislation ruling out an extension to the existing transition period beyond December 2020. 
Levels of Transparency
An integral part of the integrative negotiating approach is the provision of high levels of 
transparency, not only towards domestic constituents, but also vis-à-vis the negotiating 
partner. If parties share information openly and consider the perspective of the other, the 
chances of finding solutions are seen to increase (Odell, 2000). To reach an agreement parties 
need to have ‘good understanding of their own preferences and priorities, to communicate 
those to their counterpart and to integrate information about each other’s preferences and 
priorities into their own understanding of the problem at hand’ (Van der Schalk et al., 2010: 
356). When being open and transparent, negotiators are also considered more likely to 
develop or maintain a close relationship based on trust (Walton and McKerise, 1966; Lax and 
Sebenius, 1986). In contrast, negotiators adopting a distributional approach tend to be less 
willing to share information both with their negotiating partner and their domestic 
constituents. Withholding a certain amount of information is deemed necessary not to reveal 
your bottom line, and avoid exploitation by the other party, which might try to gain 
distributional advantages at your expense (ibid). This approach of keeping one’s cards close 
to the chest is clearly less conducive to trust building. 
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The EU’s Approach
Throughout the negotiations the EU negotiators adopted high levels of transparency, both 
internally and towards the UK and the wider public. They saw transparency as essential to the 
success of the negotiations, and the Commission’s website stressed how the ‘unprecedented 
nature’ of the UK’s exit required a ‘tailor-made approach to transparency’ and that the 
Commission aimed ‘to ensure a maximum level of transparency throughout the negotiations’. 
A progress report on the negotiations confirmed that they were indeed ‘carried out with 
unprecedented transparency’ (European Commission, 2017b). Publicly published documents 
include negotiating agendas, EU position papers, EU non-papers, EU text proposals, fact 
sheets, speeches, and the agreements reached. 
The EU did not consider this level of transparency to undermine its negotiation approach, or 
risk the UK gaining distributional advantages. Given the non-distributional nature of the 
issues at stake, the EU negotiators saw this open approach as effective in identifying the true 
interests of the two parties – interests that to a great extent overlapped and did not require 
compromises between two polar opposites. Both parties agreed on the importance of 
protecting the citizens’ rights; ensuring an orderly withdrawal with a smooth phasing-out of 
existing cooperative procedures; and maintaining an open border on the island of Ireland.  
None of these issues exposed dynamics where parties were likely to have a bottom line that 
needed hiding from the other party. As a result, the EU negotiators had nothing to lose 
through its transparent approach. If anything, the EU gained advantages from it. It helped 
raise awareness about the Brexit process, not only among the MSs and MEPs, but also among 
the wider public. It was seen to facilitate and encourage debate and participation, bringing 
together civil society across the EU (Kendrick and Sangiuolo, 2017, p. 13), and helping 
national parliaments to engage in ‘informed discussions, reply to citizens’ questions and 
engage in public debate’ (Barnier, 2017). The Brexit process proved much more difficult and 
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complex than some predicted, and initial expectations that it could lead to a domino effect of 
other MSs leaving the EU have not materialised. Instead, recent polls indicate a growing 
appreciation for the EU among citizens across the EU (Eurobarometer, 2019). The European 
Ombudsman (2019) confirmed how the high levels of transparency gave the EU negotiators 
advantages, as it ‘increased their legitimacy in the eyes of the public and it has helped to keep 
the EU united, as MSs, the European Parliament and citizens were kept informed and 
included at each step in the process’. Through their open and transparent approach, the EU 
negotiators also became the first point-of-call for many media outlets, helping them to control 
the public narrative around Brexit (Kendrick and Sangiuolo, 2017, p. 15). 
The UK’s Approach
From the start, the UK negotiators adopted a secretive approach, and stressed that there would 
not be ‘a running commentary of every twist and turn of the negotiations’ in Parliament, and 
they would ‘not reveal [their] hand prematurely’ (Reuters, 2016). This approach continued, 
and there was a widespread ‘culture of extraordinary secrecy’ throughout the negotiations 
(Owen et al., 2018). An example was the reluctance to share governmental sectoral impact 
analyses of Brexit, forcing Parliament to use the ‘humble address’ procedure in November 
2017, by which the monarch ordered the release of the analyses for parliamentary scrutiny 
(Durrant et al., 2019). Another example is the historical motion passed by MPs in December 
2018, holding the government in contempt over its failure to release the legal advice carried 
out by the Cabinet on the WA. Unlike the EP and the Council, Parliament had to ask, and 
often fight for the information needed.
As for transparency vis-à-vis the media and the general public, May explained early on how 
‘every stray word and every hyped up media report is going to make it harder for us to get the 
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right deal for Britain’ and that ‘the government will not be pressured into saying more than I 
believe it is in our national interest to say…it is not my job to fill column inches with daily 
updates’ (May 2017). In line with the distributional logic, revealing the UK negotiating 
position too early was seen to affect its ability to reach a successful deal (Kendrick and 
Sangiuolo, 2017).
However, this position was difficult to maintain in the face of the EU’s extensive provisions 
of transparency, and there were suspicions that the lack of transparency reflected a lack of 
planning. As a consequence, the UK started to publish information on its website, including 
position papers, speeches, statements and white papers (ibid.). Yet, the notion of secrecy 
continued to prevail in Whitehall. Despite Davis, then Secretary of DexEU, explicitly 
committing that the government ‘would not want either House of Parliament to be 
disadvantaged with respect to the European Parliament’ (House of Lords 2016), many 
decisions were taken behind closed doors by the PM with a small number of select Ministers 
and civil servants. This, together with the internal division within Government, led to several 
alleged leaks to the press, publicly exposing the internal divisions on the UK side, which in 
turn contributed to the decreasing levels of trust in the government, both by MPs and the 
general public (Durrant et al., 2019). 
In terms of transparency towards the EU, most of the agenda items and discussion documents 
originated in Brussels, forcing the UK to respond to, rather than initiate negotiating 
proposals. And even when responding, the UK was not particularly forthcoming with 




The comparison between the EU’s and the UK’s approaches in the withdrawal negotiations 
demonstrates how the EU leaned further towards the integrative end of the negotiating 
spectrum, with extensive internal consultations, a willingness to engage in open and interest-
based discussions aimed at problem-solving, and high levels of transparency, while the UK 
leaned more to the distributive end, reflecting less engagement and consultation with 
domestic constituents, a focus on pre-determined positions that need defending, and lower 
levels of transparency. 
Even if the rational expectation was that both parties would adopt integrative approaches, this 
did not materialise. The clash of approaches highlights how the UK underestimated the 
complexity of the negotiations, and rather than perceiving Brexit as a joint issue that needed 
to be approached with a problem-solving attitude, it mostly saw Brexit in terms of distributive 
bargaining, and adapted its approach accordingly. Since a fully integrative dynamic only 
emerges if both parties perceive the negotiations in the same way, the clash of approaches has 
led, in line with distributional logic, to relational tensions and decreasing levels of trust. This 
is likely to have an impact on the approaches adopted in the negotiations about the future EU-
UK relationship, which are about to start at the time of writing. 
UK is sticking to its positions on not extending to transition period beyond 31 December 
2020, and being ready to accept a no-deal scenario ‘if it is not possible to negotiate a 
satisfactory outcome’ (HM Government, 2020).  Given the government’s significant 
parliamentary majority, there will be less need for extensive inter-institutional consultations. 
And although the government did publish its approach for the upcoming negotiations (ibd.), 
its culture of secrecy is unlikely to change overnight. 
While the EU is expected to continue to provide high levels of transparency and engage in 
extensive inter-institutional consultations, as this approach has served it well so far, it is more 
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likely to engage in positional bargaining. Not only are the issues (such as trade-offs between 
market access and dynamic alignment, or quotas and access to fishing waters) more 
distributive in nature, but also, the UK’s low priority of maintaining a close relationship based 
on trust has decreased the EU incentives to adopt an open and interest-based approach. After 
all, even if support for the EU has increased among EU citizens since the UK referendum, the 
EU wants to ensure that the UK, as a non-member of the Union, ‘cannot have the same rights 
and enjoy the same benefits as a member’ (Council of the EU, 2020), in order not to set a 
precedent with Brexit. 
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